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POST-MINORITY SUPPORT FOR COLLEGE
EDUCATION-A LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE
OBLIGATION IN DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS?
KATHLEEN CONREY HORAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
When a child reaches the statutory age of majority, he is emancipated
by operation of law. He may vote, sign contracts, and engage in the full
panoply of "adult" privileges and responsibilities. He is presumed to be
independent, and his parents' legal and financial obligations to him terminate.
. Whether he is, in fact, independent is another issue. An example that
comes readily to mind is a child who is physically or mentally handicapped
who may remain dependent beyond the age of majority, possibly for life.
Many states impose a duty of post-minority support upon parents of
disabled children even after the children reach the statutory age of majority.' This Article focuses on whether it is appropriate to carve out a second
exception to the general rule of automatic emancipation for adult children
who remain financially dependent by virtue of their status as college
students.
In 1971, the voting age was lowered from twenty-one to eighteen by
adoption of the 26th Amendment. 2 This occurred in the wake of the
Vietnam War and reflected the sentiment that if eighteen-year-olds were
old enough to be drafted and sent to war, they were old enough to
participate in the election of the politicians who made such decisions.
Most states went beyond the requirements of the constitutional amendment, passing statutes which not only permitted eighteen-year-olds to
vote, but reduced the age of majority to eighteen for most other purposes
also.'
*Ms. Horan's article received the first place award in the 1986 Howard C. Schwab Memorial
Award Contest in the field of family law. It first appeared in FAMILY LAW QUARTERLY Volume XX,
Number 4, Winter 1987. She graduated from the University of New Mexico Law School in May
1986 and is now practicing with the law firm of Hatch, Beitler, Allen & Shepherd in Albuquerque,
New Mexico.
1. Adult children who are physically or mentally disabled are frequently unable to earn a living.
Parental support for them can be required under pauper statutes which exist in 46 states. North
Carolina, Tennessee, Washington, and Wyoming do not have such provisions. Washburn, PostMajority Support: Oh Dad, Poor Dad, 44 TEMP. L.Q. 319, 340 (1971). Since the child cannot
physically provide for himself, the age of majority has no bearing. The obligation ceases only when
the child's needs cease. Id. at 340)45. See also H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIc RELATIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES 495 (1968).

2. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § I.

3. An example is the New Mexico statute which provides: "[Any person who has reached his
eighteenth birthday shall be considered to have reached his majority as provided in Section 12-2-2
NMSA 1978 and is an adult for all purposes the same as if he had reached his twenty-first birthday."
N.M. STAT. ANN § 28-6-1 1978 (1987 Repl.).
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It is doubtful that state legislatures considered all the areas that would
be affected by these changes. Some states drafted specific provisions for
perceived problem areas. New Jersey, for example, reduced the age of
majority to eighteen for "all basic civil and contractual rights," but raised
the drinking age from nineteen to twenty-one.4 These states are the exception, however. Most states left interpretation application of the new law
to the courts.
Family law litigation felt an immediate impact. Child support is for
minor children. 5 Noncustodial parents nationwide sought to have the new
laws interpreted to mean that the duty of child support had been reduced
by three years. 6 The debate centered around the term "minority" in decrees
issued before the new law. Did "minority" still mean twenty-one or did
the statutory change affect existing decrees by reducing the support obligation to age eighteen?
In some states, statutes specified that the change would be prospective
only, so that any previously existing privileges or obligations would not
be affected. 7 Where the statute did not mandate prospective application
only, some courts achieved that result by judicial construction. In other
states, the courts noted that the intent of the child support provision was
to provide support for minor children.' Because children now achieved
adult status at eighteen, they were no longer entitled to parental support
until they reached age twenty-one.'
The bulk of case law in the early 1970s concerned court interpretation
of existing decrees. Sixteen years have passed since the constitutional
amendment, and that issue is nearly moot.'0 The pressing issues now are
whether a divorce court has statutory authority to compel post-minority
support in divorce proceedings which began after the passage of the
statutory change in the age of majority; whether divorcing parties may
voluntarily elect to bind themselves to do so in an agreement that will
4. Basic civil and contractual rights include the following: the right to contract, sue, be sued and
defend civil actions, serve on juries, marry, adopt children and bet. N.J. STAT. ANN. §9:17B-1
(West 1983).
5. This rule is derived from the policy that the child is a ward of the court. When the child ceases
to be a ward of the court, the jurisdiction of the court over the child is terminated. Note, Child
Support Extended, 10 GoNz. L. REv. 933 (1975).
6. Note, Effect of Change in Age of Majority Upon Parents' Duty of Support, 23 KANSAS L. REv.
181 (1974).
7. E.g., Florida's statute provides: "This section shall operate prospectively and not retrospectively, and shall not affect the rights and obligations existing prior to July 1, 1973." FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 743.07(3) (West 1973).
8. The Kansas Supreme Court in Junghohann v. Junghohann, 213 Kan. 329, 516 P.2d 904 (1973),
held that child support terminated when the child reached 18 (although 21 was the age of majority
when the decree was entered) because the district court's continuing jurisdiction to enforce the decree
terminated when the child reached majority.
9. Id.
10. In the fifteen years since the age of majority was reduced, nearly all children who were then
minors have reached majority.
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be enforceable later; and whether statutes which currently prohibit courts
from ordering post-minority support should be modified.
The reduction in the age of majority to eighteen made an existing
problem more acute. Whereas a twenty-one-year old may be almost through
college, many eighteen-year-olds are still in high school. Prior to the
change in the age of majority, courts could provide for college tuition
(in the appropriate case) by increasing the amount of child support as
needed when the child entered college. Though many college students
did not graduate until after their twenty-first birthdays, the issue of postminority support was infrequently litigated because the hardship on the
child or custodial parent to provide for a final year of college was less
burdensome."
The reduced age of majority created an additional problem, one of
jurisdiction. 2 Equity suggested continued support in many circumstances,
yet jurisdictional considerations seemed to preclude further intervention
by the courts once the children reached majority. The continuing jurisdiction of the divorce court over child custody and support is traditionally
based on the notion that minor children are "wards of the court. "' 3 Thus,
once the children reach majority, the court must relinquish control. "
What was to be done about providing support to children who were
still in high school at age eighteen, or those who were younger at the
time of divorce but who would clearly expect to attend college? Different
jurisdictions arrived at different conclusions. Those jurisdictions can be
broken down into three categories:
1. Jurisdictions which compel post-minority support, even absent an
agreement by the parents, if the circumstances so dictate.
2. Jurisdictions which enforce post-minority support pursuant to an
agreement by the parties which is either a separate contract, or has
been incorporated into the divorce decree.
3. Jurisdictions which neither compel post-minority support nor enforce
any agreement of a parent to provide for post-minority support.
A number of states permit court-initiated awards of post-minority support.' 5 The child support statutes in Pennsylvania, for instance, use the
1I. Marshall, Post-Minority Child Support in DissolutionProceedings, 54 WASH. L. REv. 4759,
462 (1979).
12. "If the statute allows support for minors only, the vast majority of cases holds that the court
has no jurisdiction to order post-majority support." See, Washburn, supra, note I, at 329.
13. Note, Child Support Extended, 10 GoNz. L. REv. 933 (1975).
14. Id.
15. Examples of states which currently permit court-compelled post-minority support include:
New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, California, Colorado, Washington, Iowa,
Indiana, Oregon, Illinois, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Missouri. Annotation, 99 A.L.R.3d 322
(1980). Florida will compel post-minority support upon a finding of actual dependency, but attendance
at college does not necessarily render a child dependent. See Slaton v. Slaton, 428 So. 2d 347 (Fla.
I Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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term "child" without specifically restricting it to minors.", Other courts
also have held that the term "child" does not preclude adult children and
have awarded post-minority support. 7
Other states enacted statutory changes enabling post-minority support
after judicial decisions held that existing statutes precluded support for
children over age eighteen. For example, in 1973, Washington adopted
a statute 8 which was interpreted in Childers v. Childers as removing "a
jurisdictional bar which previously prevented most postmajority child
support." 9 In the above examples, post-minority support was permitted
via statutory construction of provisions which do not limit support to
minor children, or which have amended existing statutes explicitly to
permit support awards to children over eighteen.
In contrast there are states with statutes which limit child support to
"minor children." '2 The language is generally held to limit the court's
equitable power in child support proceedings to children under the age
of minority. 2' Such states typically preclude any post-minority intervention by the divorce court.22 In Helber v. Frazelle,23 an Arizona court held
that although a father had agreed to provide his children with funds for
college, the court was without power to enforce the agreement because
the children were no longer minors.24 The court further held that since
the agreement had been incorporated in the divorce decree, it could not
be enforced in a separate contract action.25
In the middle position are states which will not compel post-minority
support unless the parties voluntarily agreed to undertake the responsibility to pay such support.26 If the parties have agreed, the agreement is
16. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 1973 (Purdon 1968) (relatives' responsibility for indigent children);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1783 (Purdon 1962) (relatives' responsibility for inmates of state institutions); § 131 (Purdon 1965) (actions for support and maintenance). See Lederer v. Lederer, 291 Pa.
Super. 22, 435 A.2d 199 (1981).
17. Examples of states that imply jurisdiction based on the absence of the limiting term "minor"
include: New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, California, and Colorado. See
French v. French, 117 N.H. 696, 378 A.2d 1127 (1977).
18. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.170 (1974).
19. Note, Child Support Extended, 10 GONZ. L. REV. 933 (1975) (citing In Re Marriage of
Melville, I I Wa. App. 879, 526 P.2d 1228 (1974)).
20. See, e.g.,
N.M. STAT. ANN. §40-4-7 (1978).
21. See supra.
22. Id.
23. 118 Ariz. 217, 575 P.2d 1243 (1978).
24. Id.at 575 P.2d 1244.
25. Id. An earlier Arizona case, Genda v. Superior Court, 103 Ariz. 240, 439 P.2d 811, overruled
by Helber v. Frazelle, supra note 23. (1968), permitted post-minority support pursuant to an agreement. The Genda court acknowledged that this was an exception to the general rule against postminority support, but reasoned that it was permissible as an exercise of the court's equitable power
to enforce the contractual agreement of the parties.
26. Some states will enforce post-minority support pursuant to an agreement by the parties,
including Michigan, Ohio, South Carolina, Georgia, South Dakota, Oklahoma, and Florida. The
general rule in these states is as follows: "A husband may by agreement incorporated in the divorce
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enforceable whether the agreement was incorporated into the final divorce
decree or maintained as an independent contract. 27 The agreement is held
valid and enforceable as a bargained-for contract between the parties,28
or under a theory of promissory estoppel. 29 The agreement may then be
enforced as a child support obligation by the divorce court or in a breach
of contract action in a separate proceeding.3"
This Article considers whether divorcing parties may create an enforceable agreement to finance their children's college educations, and whether,
absent an agreement, a court may compel them to do so. The threshold
determination is whether a divorce court has jurisdiction to determine
support matters concerning an adult child.While most courts recognize
3
the moral duty of parents to support their
3 2 children, absent "jurisdiction,"
there is no forum to enforce the duty.
The next inquiry is whether it is appropriate for courts to intervene in
the decision to send a child to college, a decision which is traditionally
left to the parents' discretion. There are a number of conflicting policy
considerations and no easy answers.
In some jurisdictions, courts award post-minority support in spite of
apparent jurisdictional prohibitions. 33 In contrast, some states which do
decree . . . become obligated to provide a college education for his child even though the performance required by the decree may extend beyond the minority of the child." 27B C.J.S. Divorce
§ 319, 610 (1985).
27. See, Ovaitt v. Ovaitt, 43 Mich. App. 628, 204 N.W. 2d 753 (1972).
28. Michigan adopted Ohio's position that post-minority support was enforceable if the parties
agreed to it. The Michigan court remarked that "it may be safely assumed that defendant (wife) in
this case surrendered some rights as bargained-for consideration for plaintiff's (husband's) postmajority support agreement." Ovaitt v. Ovaitt, 43 Mich. App. 628, 632, 204 N.W.2d 753, 757
(1972). See Robrock v. Robrock, 167 Ohio St. 479, 150 N.E.2d 421 (1958); see also Kasper v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 412 Mich. 232, 313 N.W.2d 904 (1981); Krueger v. Krueger, 88 Mich.
App. 722, 278 N.W.2d 514 (1979).
29. Even where there was no written agreement by the noncustodial parent to provide college
support, some courts have enforced payment under a theory of promissory estoppel. In Zimmerman
v. Zimmerman, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2184 (N.Y. Jan. 18, 1982), a father orally agreed to pay
for college if his daughter attended a local college. She did. The father started paying the bill but
later stopped. He was held liable for the tuition. The majority opinion held the promise enforceable
as an oral contract that could be performed within one year which thus did not violate the statute
of frauds. The concurring opinion held that the father had made a promise which he should have
reasonably expected his daughter to rely on and which she did in fact rely on to her detriment. Id.
at 2185.
30. The Ovaitt court allowed the custodial parent to enforce the agreement (for post-minority
support directly without resorting to a separate action in contract or quantum meruit) to obviate
"circuity of action." Ovian, 43 Mich. App. at 633,204 N.W.2d at 758. The court noted the possibility
that there may not be an independent basis to support a separate cause of action once the agreement
is merged in the judgment. Id. at 628, 204 N.W.2d 753. Other jurisdictions have so held. See, e.g.,
Spingola v. Spingola, 93 N.M. 598, 603 P.2d 708 (1979).
31. Washburn, supra note i, at 319.
32. Id.
33. In New York, the statutory duty of support terminates at age 21, but there is a judicially
defined standard of exceptional circumstances which courts rely on in awarding post-minority support.
See Lord v. Lord, 96 Misc. 2d 434, 409 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1978).
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not permit post-minority support have preordained that result, perhaps
intentionally, by framing the question in terms of jurisdiction.' 4 This
discussion first examines the role of statutory construction in determining
whether a divorce court has jurisdiction to award post-minority support.
The Article then considers the underlying policy concerns which should
be the focus of discussion once jurisdictional barriers and narrow questions of statutory construction have been resolved.
II. JURISDICTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
"Jurisdiction" in this context refers to the continuing, equitable jurisdiction that a court has over the issues and parties to a divorce after it
has rendered an initial decision.3 5 It should not be confused with initial
subject matter jurisdiction to determine domestic relations matters, including issues of child support, which is a separate question. Statutes confer
jurisdiction over adult children by implication or by express language.
A. Implied Jurisdiction
A number of state courts36 cited the absence of restrictive language in
their statutes to conclude that post-minority support could be compelled.
A New Hampshire case, French v. French,37 is illustrative. In determining
that there was jurisdiction, the court noted that in the statute pertaining
to custody, support, and education of children, the word "minor" did
not appear.3" The court reasoned that "because jurisdiction to award
education expenses is not limited as a matter of law to jurisdiction over
minors, if the legislature had intended that there be such a limitation, it
could easily have said so.""
French was followed in subsequent New Hampshire cases' and was
frequently cited by other states construing similar statutes." In 1985,
however, New Hampshire's statute was amended and now provides that
"[uinless the court . . . specifies differently, the amount of a child support
obligation . . . shall remain as stated . . . until . . . all dependent chil34. See Spingola. 93 N.M. 598, 603 P.2d 708.
35. Washburn, supra note 1, at 329-31. See also 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 303, 421-25 (1985).
36. See, e.g., New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey; supra notes 16 and
17, infra note 45.
37. 117 N.H. 696, 378 A.2d 1127 (1977).
38. Id.at 698, 378 A.2d at 1129.
39. Id.
40. See Bernier v. Bernier, 125 N.H. 517, 484 A.2d 1088 (1984); Heinze v. Heinze, 122 N.H.
358, 444 A.2d 559 (1982); Merrifield v. Merrifield, 122 N.H. 372, 445 A.2d 1087 (1982).
41. See Parrish v. Parrish, 138 Mich. App. 546, 361 N.W.2d 366 (1984); Olson v. Olson, 445
N.E.2d 1386 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Kamp v. Kamp, 640 P.2d 48 (Wyo. 1982); Hinchey v. Hinchey,
625 P.2d 297 (Alaska 1981).
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dren for whom support is provided in the order shall terminate their high
school education or reach the age of eighteen years, whichever is later...
at which time the child support obligation terminates without further legal
action.'42 The statute then provides for post-minority support if a child
'is handicapped. 43
New York statutes explicitly provide for court jurisdiction to award
support until the child reaches age twenty-one. 44 Nonetheless, New York
courts have struggled with the issue of whether a child over age twentyone who is attending college may obtain continued court-ordered support. 45 New York statutes mandate parental responsibility for poor or
incapacitated children." Before 1966, there was no express restriction of
the support obligation solely to minors, and most New York courts extended
the child support duty beyond majority if it seemed appropriate to do
so." 7 In 1966, the Family Court Act was amended to include language
that "a parent shall be responsible only for the support of a minor child.""
Despite the addition of the word "minor," the courts continued to award
post-minority support where there were "exceptional circumstances." '49
What constitutes exceptional circumstances has been defined by case
law.'
A representative case is Lord v. Lord.5 In Lord the court found exceptional circumstances because both parents were college graduates, both
could afford to support the child through college, and two older siblings
were already in college.5 2 The court conceded that "absent exceptional
circumstances, the father's obligation to support a child terminates when
the child becomes twenty-one." 53 The court then went on to hold that,
absent precedent spelling out what exceptional circumstances were, the
above-cited facts should "cross the threshold. "'
42. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §458:35-C (1985).
43. Id.
44. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT §413 (McKinney 1984).
45. See Weber v. Weber, 51 Misc. 2d 1042, 274 N.Y.S. 2d 791 (Fam. Ct. 1966).
46. N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law §43.03(a) (McKinney 1978); N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 101(l) (McKinney
1983); N.Y. Faro. Ct. Act §415 (McKinney 1977); N.Y. Fain. Ct. Act. §443 (McKinney 1983);
N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 20.40(4)(A) (McKinney 1981).
47. Washburn, supra note 1, at 320.
48. N.Y. Faro. Ct. Act §415 (McKinney 1977).
49. N.Y. Faro. Ct. Act § 443(b) (McKinney 1963) provided that: "An order of support under this
section may not run beyond the child's minority. The court may, however, extend the duration of
such an order beyond the child's minority if the child suffers physical or mental disabilities or if
there are other exceptional circumstances that warrant such extension." This section was repealed,
nonetheless courts continued to award post-majority support using the former standard.
50. See Lord v. Lord, 96 Misc. 2d 434, 409 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1978).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 436, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 48.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 43, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 49.
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Subsequent decisions contain similar language,55 and generally reflect
the court's balancing of equitable considerations, including the needs,
expectations, and abilities of the child, against the hardship that postminority support will impose on the noncustodial parent.56 New York's
statute was amended in 1983 to include a list of "relevant factors" the
court should look to in awarding child support.57 These include "the
physical and emotional health of the child, and his or her educational or
vocational needs and aptitudes." 58 The commentator notes that "[t]his
requirement should give added impetus to the trend toward ordering
respondent parents to help pay for private schooling and college." 59
Pennsylvania is another state whose child support statutes do not specifically restrict jurisdiction to minors.' Although not required by statute
to do so, most Pennsylvania courts restrict support to minors. 6 However,
a number of courts allow post-minority support on a finding that the
circumstances in a particular case merit an award, and the resulting obligation will not result in undue hardship to the parent.62
In New Jersey, the age of majority is eighteen, but attaining the age
of majority is only prima facie evidence of emancipation.63 Whether a
child is emancipated at age eighteen, with correlative termination of his
rights to parental support, depends upon the facts of each case.'
55. See, e.g., Vetrano v. Calvey, 477 N.Y.S.2d 522, 102 A.D.2d 932 (1984); Brundage v.
Brundage, 474 N.Y.S.2d 546, 100 A.D.2d 887 (1984).
56. Id.
57. Section 413 now provides:
The court shall make its award for child support after consideration of all relevant
factors, including: (i) the financial resources of the parents and those of the child;
(ii) the physical and emotional health of the child, and his or her educational or
vocational needs and aptitudes; (iii) where practical and relevant, the standard of
living the child would have enjoyed had the family remained intact; (iv) where
practical and relevant, the tax consequences to the parties; and (v) the nonmonetary contributions that the parents will make toward the care and well-being
of the child.
N.Y. Fain. Ct. Act §413 (McKinney 1984).
58. Id.
59. Besharov, SupplementaryPracticeCommentary which follows N.Y.Fam. Ct.Act §416 (McKinney
1985).
60. Schearer v. Schearer, 208 Pa. Super. 196, 222 A.2d 620 (1966); Brown v. Weidner, 208 Pa.
Super. 114, 220 A.2d 382 (1966); Commonwealth v. Camp, II Ches. Co. Rep. 214 (Pa. Q. S.
1962); Rice v. Rice, 1 Adams L.J. 91 (Pa. Q. S. 1959); In re McCready's Trust, 387 Pa. 107, 126
A.2d 429 (1956).
61. Larsen v. Larsen, 211 Pa. Super. 30, 234 A.2d 18 (1967); Decker v. Decker, 204 Pa. Super.
156, 203 A.2d 343 (1964); Engel v. Gast, 3 Pa. D. & C.2d 193 (1954); In re George E. Eamshaw,
Jr., 6 Ches. Co. Rep. 274 (Pa. C.P. 1954).
62. Lederer v. Lederer, 291 Pa. Super. 22, 435 A.2d 199 (1981); Decker v. Decker, 204 Pa.
Super. 156, 203 A.2d 343 (1964); Groff v. Groff, 173 Pa. Super. 535, 98 A.2d 449 (1953).
63. Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 443 A.2d 1031 (1982); Alford v. Somerset County Welfare
Bd., 158 N.J. Super. 302, 310, 385 A.2d 1275, 1278 (1978); Turner v. McCune, 4 Mass. App. Ct.
864, 357 N.E.2d 942 (1976); Limpert v. Limpert, 119 N.J. Super. 438, 440, 292 A.2d 38, 39
(1972).
64. Newburgh, 88 N.J. at 536, 443 A.2d at 1038.
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The general rule is that a parent is under no duty to contribute to the
support of his child after the child has become emancipated.65 Two exceptions to this rule have been suggested: an adult child suffering from a
physical or mental deficiency,' and "the college education exception. "67
While parents are not generally under a duty to support children after the
age or majority, appropriate circumstances may create a parental duty to
assure a necessary education for their children.'
Colorado also determined that educationally dependent as well as physically or mentally handicapped children were entitled to post-minority
support.' A 1983 Colorado decision, Koltay v. Koltay,70 held that it was
proper to order post-minority support for a disabled child still dependent
on the parents for support. 7' The Colorado Court of Appeals extended
that ruling in In Re Marriage of Plummer72 to include post-minority
support for education. The court reasoned that the attainment of age
eighteen only creates a presumption of emancipation which may be overcome by a finding of continuing dependency, either because of disability
or because of continuing educational needs .7 The court was guided by
the stated legislative intent that the statute be liberally construed in order
"[t]o mitigate the potential harm to the spouses and their children caused
by the process of legal dissolution of marriage. . . .'""
California is another state that is liberalizing its position on post-minority support. The Court of Appeals in Rebensdorf v. Rebensdorf 5 recently
upheld a son's right to maintain an action in equity to enforce a postminority parental duty of support. The plaintiff was an eighteen-year-old
high school student who claimed that he could not afford to remain in
school without his father's help. 76 The California statute governing support provides that "[i]t is the duty of the father, the mother, and the
children of any person in need who is unable to maintain himself by
work, to maintain such person to the extent of their ability. 7 7 The Rebensdorfcourt noted that "[w]hile no appellate decisions require such support,
neither are there any cases giving the parents the right to terminate support
at age eighteen." 78 The court speculated that the dearth of case law "may
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Sakovits v. Sakovits, 178 N.J. Super. 623, 429 A.2d 1091 (1981).
Id. at 625, 429 A.2d at 1093.
Id.
Newburgh, 88 N.J. at 536, 443 A.2d at 1038.
Koltay v. Koltay, 667 P.2d 1374 (Colo. 1983).
Id.
Id.
703 P.2d 657 (Colo. App. 1985).
Id. at 658-59.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-102(b) (1973).
169 Cal. App. 3d 138, 215 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1985).
Id.

77. CAL. CIv. CODE § 206 (West 1985).

78. Rebensdorf, 169 Cal. App. 3d at 144, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
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be accounted for by the simple fact that most people assume such a
parental obligation presently exists."'
The risk of implying jurisdiction from the absence of a contrary provision was illustrated by the recent statutory change in New Hampshire.8"
Following French,"'the New Hampshire legislature amended the vague
statute to prevent the court from continuing to construe the statute as
providing for post-minority support.82
Post-minority support was similarly fated in Alaska. In 198 1, the Alaska
Supreme Court decided Hinchey v. Hinchey.8 3 The court interpreted the
state support statute and employed reasoning very similar to that of French.'
The court awarded post-minority support reasoning that since the statute
contained no express limitations, "we think the term 'children' in the
context employed, is ambiguous and thus subject to judicial construction."" A few years after Hinchey was decided, the Alaska court in
Dowling v. Dowling 6 interpreted the same statutory language to preclude
post-minority support and to specifically overrule Hinchey.87 While the
basic support statute does not contain the language "minor, ' 88 other
related statutes do.89 Dowling criticized the Hinchey court for not considering other relevant statutes in determining legislative intent." "In
light of these provisions, we are not convinced that the legislature intended
to provide for post-majority educational support. . . .
The Alaska cases illustrate the conflicting interpretations that result
from implying legislative intent from ambiguously phrased statutes. Such
conflicts can be avoided by enacting statutes which specify whether postminority support is permissible.
B. Express Jurisdiction
In a growing number of states, the legislatures have enacted specific
79. Id.
80. See supra note 42.
81. See supra note 37.
82. See supra note 42.
83. 625 P.2d 297 (Alaska 1981).
84. See supra note 37.
85. 625 P.2d 297, 300 (Alaska 1981).
86. 679 P.2d 480 (Alaska 1984).
87. Id.at 483.
88. The Alaska statute which provides for child support states, in pertinent part, that: "[Tlhe
court may provide ... for the payment ... as may be just and proper for the parties to contribute
toward the nurture and education of their children..." ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160 (1983).
89. See, e.g., Section 25.24.170 which authorizes a court to modify a child support order to
provide "for the care . . . of the minor children." ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.170 (1983). Section
11.51.120 states that a person is criminally liable if, "[b]eing a person legally charged with the
support of a child under 18 years of age, the person fails without lawful excuse to provide support
for the child." ALAsKA STAT. § 11.51.120 (1983).
90. Dowling, 679 P.2d at 483.
91. Id.
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statutory changes in their domestic relations law to permit post-minority
support.' Washington is perhaps the best example of legislative efforts.
Washington courts have traditionally recognized the duty of a noncustodial
parent to provide support for children who are in college.93 Although such
support was previously limited to the children's minority, this limitation
was not a significant problem until the age of majority was reduced from
twenty-one to eighteen. Most students were approaching economic independence or the completion of their education by age twenty-one.' As
previously mentioned, the problem became significant in 1971 when
eighteen became the age of majority.9"
9
In 1973, the legislature passed the 1973 Washington Dissolution Act. ,
It provided:
In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, legal separation, declaration of invalidity, maintenance, or child support, after considering
all relevant factors but without regard to marital misconduct, the
court may order either or both parents owing a duty of support to
any child of the marriage dependent upon either or both spouses to
pay an amount reasonable or necessary for his support.9'
The Act further stated that child support would terminate on emancipation
of the child unless expressed otherwise in the decree. 98
The provisions of the new Act pertaining to post-minority child support
were interpreted in Childers v. Childers." In Childers, the court found
from the language of the Dissolution Act that the legislature intended to
remove the jurisdictional bar previously prohibiting an order of postminority support in dissolution proceedings."°° This determination was
based on the fact that the legislature had specifically changed the word
"minor" to "dependent" and had included a provision allowing courts
to specify0 a time other than emancipation of the child for termination of
support. 1 1
The court in Childers then outlined an expanded definition of "dependent" wherein
age is but one factor. Other factors would include the child's needs,
prospects, desires, aptitudes, abilities, and disabilities, and the par92. See e.g., Oregon, Washington, Iowa, Illinois, and Indiana. See supra note 15.
93. Esteb v. Esteb, 138 Wash. 174, 244 P. 264 (1926).
94. Marshall, Post-MinorityChild Support in Dissolution Proceedings, 54 WASH. L. REv. 459,
462 (1979).
95. Id..
96. WASH REV. CODE ANN. §26.09.100 (1976).
97. Id.
98. WASH REV. CODE ANN. §26.09.170 (1976).
99. 89 Wash. 2d 592, 575 P.2d 201 (1978).
100. Id. at 595, 575 P.2d at 204-05.
101. Id.
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ents' level of education, standard of living, and current and future
resources. Also to be considered is the amount and type of support
(i.e., the advantages, educational and otherwise) that the child would
have been afforded if his parents had stayed together.'° 2
The Childers court concluded that if, but for the divorce, the children
would most likely have remained dependent on their father past the age
of eighteen while they were in college, the court could define them as
dependents within the meaning of the statute.' 0 3 Subsequent case law in
Washington has reaffirmed the court's interpretation of the statute in
Childers. "
Another state which has enacted a specific statutory amendment to
provide for post-minority support is Iowa. Although "minor child" means
any person under eighteen, 5 the Iowa statute specifically provides for
continued support "for a child who is between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-two years who is regularly attending . . .[high school or its equivalent] or is, ...
in good faith, a full-time student in a college . . . or
has been accepted for admission to a college. . . .

The purpose of the statutory amendment in Iowa was to bring the
obligation of support more in line with changing concepts of adulthood.'0 7
The court in In re Marriage of Vrban'0° found that it is neither arbitrary
nor unreasonable for the legislature to statutorily require divorced persons
to support their children in college, (although there is no such requirement
for married parents), because such a requirement is necessary to further
the state interest in the education of children of divorced parents." The
court concluded that promoting higher education is a legitimate state
interest. "0
Indiana has a similar statute, which provides for the award of "[s]ums
for the child's education in elementary and secondary schools and at
institutions of higher learning, taking into account the child's aptitude
and ability and the ability of the parent or parents to meet these expenses."'
102. Id. at 595, 575 P.2d at 205.
103. Id. at 596, 575 P.2d at 206.
104. Krueger v. Krueger, 37 Wash. App. 329, 679 P.2d 961 (1984). Washington courts generally
require that post-minority support be provided for in the original divorce decree; see Main v. Main,
38 Wash. App. 351, 684 P.2d 1381 (1984); Gimlet v. Gimlet, 95 Wash. 2d 699, 629 P.2d 450
(1981). On the other hand, some courts award post-minority support, not originally provided for in
the decree, on the basis of a change of circumstances; see In re Studebaker, 36 Wash. App. 815,
677 P.2d 789 (1984).
105. IOWA CODE § 598.1(3) (1972).
106. Id. § 598.1(2).
107. In re Marriage of Briggs, 225 N.W.2d 911 (Iowa 1975).
108. 293 N.W.2d 198 (Iowa 1980).
109. Id. at 202.
110. Id.
Ill. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11 .5-12(b)(1) (West 1984).
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The duty to support a child ceases when the child reaches his twentyfirst birthday, unless "[tihe child is emancipated prior to reaching twentyone (21) years of age, in which case the child support, except for the
educational needs outlined in subsection (b)(l), terminates at the time of
emancipation; however, an order for educational needs may continue in
effect until further order of the court. "1112
With such broad powers of discretion given to the court, it is not
surprising that recent Indiana case law concerns not whether post-minority
3
support is permissible, but rather, the extent of the obligation." One
such case concerned the issue of whether a father must pay tuition for
private college if public education is available. 4 The Indiana court stated
that a judge
must first ascertain what advantages are offered by the more expensive college in relation to the child's individual needs, aptitude,
ability and the child's anticipated vocation. It must then weigh these
advantages against the increased hardship that would be imposed on
the additional expense is reasonable
the father to determine whether
under the circumstances." 5
Another Indiana case involved a father's duty to resume paying support
6
if a child drops out and then goes back to school." The court held that
the father was not relieved of his court obligation to provide college
expenses even when his daughter withdrew from school at the end of her
first semester to attend beautician's school. "' When she re-enrolled twenty
months later, the duty was revived. 8
Despite Indiana's liberal provision for post-minority support, a college
education is not necessarily required to be given a child as a matter of
legal duty. 9 In Gower v. Gower, 2 o the court reaffirmed the principle that
the issue of post-minority support lies entirely within the discretion of
the trial court.' 2'
Oregon, too, has a recent statutory amendment which has been construed to permit post-minority support.' 22 A 1983 amendment to the Oregon support statute provided that a "court is not required to order support
for any minor child who has become self-supporting, emancipated or
112. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-12(d)(1) (West 1984).
113. Rohn v.Thuma, 408 N.E.2d 578 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
114. Id.

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 583.
Thiele v. Thiele, 479 N.E.2d 1324 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
Id.
Id.
Gower v. Gower, 427 N.E.2d 703, 706 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
Id.
Id.
OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105(1)(c) (1983).
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married, or has ceased to attend school after the age of 18."(emphasis
added) '23Itfurther provided that in making the support determination,
the court shall consider "Itihe expenses attributable to the physical, emotional and educational needs of the child." 24 The Oregon Court of Appeals
in Miller v. Miller'25 interpreted the new Oregon statute. The Miller court
found that "[tihe concept of emancipation has no relevancy to a parent's
obligation of school support for a child" between the ages of eighteen
and twenty-one, and reversed the trial court's termination of support for
a child who had turned eighteen."6
States which favor post-minority support are passing specific enabling
legislation.' 27 In some states the original support statutes were passed
long before the age of majority was reduced. ,'In such cases, legislatures
cannot have intended a specific result because the problem of post-minority support did not yet exist. It is not surprising that courts interpreting
such statutes have arrived at different conclusions. As noted above, the
problem of inconsistent statutory interpretation has been resolved through
the enactment of new support statutes which expressly confer or withhold
jurisdiction from the divorce court.
ll. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
It would be misleading to say that there is a national trend toward
permitting post-minority support. While some states are indeed passing
legislation toward that end and some courts are interpreting ambiguous
statutes in such a way as to permit post-minority support for education,
post-minority support remains a minority view. 29
' In fact, there are other
states that once permitted post-minority support and have since changed
their views. 3o While many commentators feel that states should remove
jurisdictional bars to post-minority support and permit the award of postminority educational support based on the facts of each case,' there are
compelling arguments on both sides of the issue.
A. Arguments In Favor of Post-minority Support
Lenore Weitzman, in her recently published text, The Divorce Revo123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. (Emphasis added).
See id. § 107.105(I)(c)(E).
9 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2407 (Or. Ct. App. 1983).
Id. at 2407.

127. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.170 (1974), OR. REV.STAT. § 107.105 (1)(c)(E)(1983), ILL. REV.

STAT. Ch. 40, para. 513 (1977), IOWA CODE §598.1 (1972), IND. CODE § 31-1-11.5-12 (1984).
128. See, e.g., New York statutes, supra note 46.
129. A. Crawford, Graduate School Support: One Last Dip Into the Proverbial Parental Pocketbook, 56 IND. L.J. 541 (1981); Marshall, supra note 95, at 460; Washburn, supra note 1.
130. E.g., Dowling v. Dowling, 679 P.2d 480 (Alaska 1984).
131. See, e.g., Washburn, supra note I, at 354-55.

Winter 19881

POST-MINORITY SUPPORT

lution, notes that when neither parent has a legal obligation to support
32
college age children, divorced mothers have defacto responsibility. A
study she conducted at Stanford revealed that while mothers typically
have less money than fathers, a larger percentage of them contribute to
33
the children's post-minority support.' Students of divorced parents who
were polled reported that they considered their mother's home "their
home.' ' I34 They also said they were more likely to ask their mothers than
their fathers for money even though they realized their mother's financial
resources were more limited because they felt that their fathers expected
35
them to work and support themselves in college.' Weitzman explains
this phenomenon by citing with approval the language of the Washington
Supreme Court in Childers: "Parents, when deprived of the custody of
their children, very often refuse to do for such children what natural
36
instinct would ordinarily prompt them to do."'
The custodial parent may be faced with a double dilemma of child
37
support funds terminating just when her expenses reach an all-time high.'
This is further complicated if the noncustodial parent's income becomes
a factor in eligibility for financial aid. If the father's income is adequate
to support the children during college, aid may be denied even if the
38
father is not, in fact, supplying support.' Weitzman feels that children
of divorced parents are at a particular disadvantage for these reasons and
feels that laws should be passed to protect them.
39
Washington's 1973 Marriage Dissolution Act' is an example of a
statutory change designed to address these inequities. In Childersv. Childers, "~the Court of Appeals overturned a lower court's award of postminority support as violative of the privileges and immunities clause of
the state constitution and the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution. ,'' The court reasoned that there were not reasonable grounds
for making a distinction between divorced parents and married parents,
because the latter were "free to bid their children a fiscal farewell at age
18. ,142
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, reasoning that while
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

L. WErrZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 278 (1985).
Id.at 279.
Id.
Id.
Childers v. Childers, 89 Wash. 2d 592, 599, 575 P.2d 201, 208 (1978).
WErrZMAN, supra note 132, at 278.
Id. at 279.
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.170 (1974).
15 Wash. App. 792, 552 P.2d 83.
Id.
Id.at 792, 552 P.2d at 85.
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the imposition of an absolute duty to provide educational support only
on divorced parents might be an unreasonable classification, it was not
the policy of the state to require all divorced parents to provide children
with a college education.' 43 Further, it was within the court's equitable
powers to minimize the disadvantages of children from broken homes:
"In allowing for divorce, the state undertakes to protect its victims."'"
The court determined that, in allowing divorce, the state created an equal
protection problem for children of divorced parents in that the children
were deprived of economic advantages which they would have enjoyed
absent divorce and which children of married parents retain. 45 The Washington Supreme Court concluded that "[elven if the legislation does create
a classification, it rests upon a reasonable basis."' The reasonableness
of the classification overcame the equal protection challenge to the statutory classification because it did not involve a suspect group or fun47
damental right. 1
The desirability of providing children with a college education is a
recurring theme in arguments for post-minority support. Advocates of
statutory change compare times past when a college education was only
available to the privileged few, to modem times when a college education
has become an economic necessity.'48 One court noted: "In the past, a
college education was reserved for the elite, but the vital impulse of
egalitarianism has inspired the creation of a wide variety of educational
institutions that provide post-secondary education for practically everyone." ' The court in French v. French5 ' expressed similar sentiments.
"[A] college education is indispensable for success in obtaining and
holding a reasonably well-paid and secure position."'"' Given a father's
duty at common law to supply "necessaries" to his minor children,' if
a college education is deemed a necessity, the courts may be justified in
imposing that duty on parents, at least during the minority of their children. "' Yet, given the reduced age of majority, a child would have completed, at most, one year of college. The result leads to a right without
a remedy.
143. Childers, 89 Wash. 2d 592, 598, 575 P.2d 201, 207.
144. Id., 575 P.2d at 207.
145. Id., 575 P.2d at 209.
146. Id., 575 P.2d at 208.
147. Id., 575 P.2d at 209.
148. Washburn, supra note 1, at 326.
149. Newburgh, supra note 63, at 1038.
150. 117 N.H. at 698, 378 A.2d at 1129.
151. Id.
152. Jackman v. Short, 165 Or. 626, 109 P.2d 860 (1941); Commonwealth v. Howell, 198
Pa.
Super. 396, 181 A.2d 903 (1962); Esteb v. Esteb, 138 Wash. 174, 244 P. 264 (1926).
153. Herbert v. Herbert, 198 Misc. 515, 98 N.Y.S. 2d 846 (1950).
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This discussion raises the issue of whether emancipation should occur
by operation of law. Is it rational to make age eighteen an automatic
cutoff? A noted commentator argues that since the child's employment
opportunities do not improve merely because he reaches majority, his
support, which is based partly on his need, should not automatically
terminate when he reaches majority.' 54 If a child cannot get a suitable job
without a college education, or if he is incapable of earning a living while
attending school, then he is not emancipated. 5 ' "The extent of support
should be determined by the facts of each case; the age of the child is
56
merely one of these factors and should not be determinative."'
It is ironic that legislatures reduced the age of majority in a period
when college education was becoming available to all. In the past, when
a college education was relatively uncommon, children were accustomed
to supporting themselves at an earlier age. In contrast, today children
remain in school longer, so they tend not to mature or become selfsufficient until later in life.' 57 Thus, they are maturing later and assuming
responsibility earlier.
Finally, and perhaps most persuasive, is the fact that in states where
post-minority support is permitted, there is a factual determination of
appropriateness done on a case-by-case basis. Courts are not compelled
to award support; they are merely given discretion to do so. In states
where such support is permitted, the case law has typically evolved a list
58
of factors to be considered by the court as a prerequisite to the award. '
These lists typically include some variation of the following factors:
whether the parent, if still living with the child, would have contributed
toward the costs of higher education; the effect of the background, values,
and goals of the parent on the reasonableness of the expectation of the
child for higher education; the amount sought; the ability of the parent
to pay that cost; the financial resources of both parents and of the child,
the commitment to and aptitude of the child; the child's ability to earn
income during the school year or vacation; the availability of financial
aid; the child's relationship to the paying parent, including mutual affection and shared goals, as well as responsiveness to parental advice and
'
guidance. 59
The goal of post-minority support is restitutionary. The court is acting
in loco parentis in an attempt to place the child in the position he would
154. Washburn, supra note I, at 329.

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
Id. at 328.
Id. at 329.
See, e.g., Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 536, 443 A.2d 1031, 1038 (1982).
Id. at 537, 443 A.2d at 1038-1039.
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have been in but for the divorce. "6Properly awarded, it serves to mitigate
the harsh economic impact of divorce on children.
B. Arguments Against Post-minority Support
The arguments against post-minority support tend to be less well articulated in the case law. This is true in part because many cases never
proceed beyond the threshold question of jurisdiction. Absent jurisdiction,
the discussion rarely proceeds to policy.
One policy issue that is frequently raised in opposition to compelled
support, however, is whether it is constitutionally permissible to impose
a duty of post-minority support on divorced parents where married parents
have no similar obligation. The argument has not been successful. 6 1
Typically, the argument appears in decisions upholding an award of support. The court defends its award as rationally related to a legitimate state
interest. 162
Constitutional issues aside, there are some very real administrative
problems that attend awarding support to an adult child who is for all
other purposes independent. Courts frequently point to the fact that children of divorced parents should not be deprived of an education to which
they would be entitled if their parents were married.' 63 "While most
parents willingly assist their adult children in obtaining a higher education . . . such support may be conditional or may be withdrawn at any
time, and no one may bring an action to enforce continued payments."'
Thus, a parent may retain control over an adult child to the extent the
child is financial dependent.
In contrast, a parent who has been ordered to pay college tuition may
have no choice over where his child goes to school, his field of study,
academic performance, and living arrangements. Indeed, the relationship
between the noncustodial parent and adult child may be so strained that
a married parent with a similar relationship would decline support.
A number of recent cases in states which permit compelled support
deal with the issues of whether it is appropriate to award support to a
child who has not seen his father in several years 65 and whether a father
160. Marshall, supra note 94. "When the parents seek to alter their marital status, the locus
parentis shifts from the parents to the dissolution court. The primary concern of the court becomes
the welfare of the child, and it seeks to mitigate as far as possible the detrimental impact of dissolution
upon the child. Thus, the court, acting in loco parentis, may extend the parental duty of support
beyond nurture per se to serve the best interests of the child." Marshall, supra note 94, at 470-71.
See also Inker & McGrath, College Educationof Minors, PartII, BOSTON B.J. at 14-15 (June 1966).
161. See, e.g., Childers, supra note 143.
162. Id. at 592, 575 P.2d 209.
163. Grapin v. Grapin, 450 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 1984).
164. Id. at 854.
165. Hambrick v. Prestwood, 382 So. 2d 474 (Miss. 1980). The Hambrick court held that the
duty of a father to send a child to college was dependent not only on the child's aptitude and
qualifications for college, but on whether the child's behavior toward and relationship with the father
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may insist that his child maintain a certain gradepoint. " The variations
are endless and the enforcement thereof an administrative nightmare.
Another issue of concern is lack of notice. Consider the following
scenario. Normally support terminates at majority, so a noncustodial
parent can plan his finances accordingly. If, upon reaching majority, the
child or his custodial parent can go back to court and have the decree
modified to include higher education expenses, it places the noncustodial
parent in a financially precarious position. Not only was the additional
support unanticipated, but in many cases the support obligation is of
indeterminate length.
Washington's Marriage Dissolution Act attempts to address the notice
issue with a requirement that such support be expressly provided for in
the decree.' 67 Under the terms of the Act, the support-paying parent is
given advance notice of the termination date or event, rather than being
forced to wait for some elusive or fortuitous date of the dependency
cessation." ' Other jurisdictions frown on awarding such support until the
issue is ripe, as occurs when the children have been accepted into or are
attending college, or are approaching the college age and have the aptitude
and inclination to attend a university."9 The delay in the decision-making
process in these latter cases is, however, inconsistent with the legal goal
of resolution of issues upon dissolution of the marriage and relief from
litigation.
Finally, many states ground the denial of post-minority support on the
fact that while it may be inconvenient for an adult child to pay his own
way through school, there is no reason he should not do so if he is healthy
and able-bodied. 170 An adult child who attends college but is capable of
working is not in need of support merely because he is in school.' 7
An underlying sentiment in these decisions seems to be that a system
makes the child "worthy" of the effort and burden it will cost the father. Where the daughter had
not seen her father for six to seven years and was extremely hostile, the father had no duty to pay
for his daughter's college education. Id. at 476.
166. Greiman v. Friedman, 90 I11.App. 3d 941, 414 N.E.2d 77 (1980). Greiman concerned a
father who stopped making voluntary payments for his daughters' tuition because of their poor
scholastic record. The court held that a student's academic record is merely one relevant factor in
deciding whether a father must pay college tuition. d.
167. Gimlett v. Gimlett, 95 Wash. 2d 699, 629 P.2d 450 (1981).
168. Id. at 452.
169. In re Marriage of Vrban, 293 N.W.2d 198 (Iowa 1980) held that while the trial court did
not err in ordering support to continue through college before the children had been accepted into
college, it would have been better if the court had waited until the statutory conditions (of being
admitted to or attending college) were met. Id.
170. See Mitchell v. Mitchell, 616 S.W.2d 753 (Ark. App. 1981); Grapin v. Grapin, 450 So. 2d
853 (Fla. 1984); Slaton v. Slaton, 428 So. 2d 347 (Fa. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Vorisek v. Vorisek,
423 So. 2d 758 (La. App. 1982); Phillips v. Phillips, 339 So. 2d 1299 (La. App. 1976); In re
Marriage of Berkbigler, 560 S.W.2d 36 (Mo. App. 1977).
171. Vorisek, 423 So. 2d 758. In Louisiana, "a major child may petition for support, if he is in
necessitous circumstances." Id. at 765. But a child "who is in school, but capable of working, is
.not by the mere fact of his schooling in need of support." Phillips, 339 So. 2d at 1299.
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of voluntary support to adult children from their parents is more likely
to foster a close relationship between parents and children. For example,
a Mississippi court in Hambrick v. Prestwood172 held that the lower court
had improperly required a father to pay for his daughter's college education where she disliked him, had no contact with him for six or seven
years, and did not want to have any contact with him. The argument is
not without merit since it more accurately reflects the decision concerning
educational support that a married parent might make. The goal of postminority support is not to make wholesale awards of college tuition, but
to replicate
as closely as possible the decisions an intact family would
73
make. 1
The problem of post;minority support does not lend itself to a simple
answer. Courts and legislatures are appropriately reluctant to intrude in
a decision that is traditionally left to the family. Yet broken families do
not always work the way they should. Situations arise where equity
demands intervention. Children are innocent parties in a divorce, and it
is the duty of the court granting the divorce to minimize injury to them.
IV. A CLOSER LOOK AT ONE JURISDICTION:
A STUDY OF NEW MEXICO LAW
The discussion thus far has centered on jurisdictional and policy considerations and the national patterns that have emerged as a result. States
which give courts discretion to compel post-minority support have generated the bulk of case law. What should be considered is the state of
the law in the states that are not making headlines. A closer look at the
development of the law of one jurisdiction which does not permit courts
to award post-minority support will provide a sharper focus on the policies
that lead jurisdictions to reach a particular result. The analysis which
follows focuses on one such state, New Mexico.
A New Mexico statute provides in pertinent part:
The district court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all matters
pertaining to the guardianship, care, custody, maintenance and education of the children, and with reference to the property decreed or
funds created for their maintenance and education, so long as they,
or any of them remain minors. 74
172. 382 So. 2d 474 (Miss. 1980). But see Hight v. Hight, 5 Ill. App. 3d 991, 284 N.E.2d 679
(1972) where the court rejected a father's claim that he should have been excused from contributing
to his daughter's educational expenses because he had not been consulted in advance. The court
reasoned that such prior consultation would have been of little value in view of the absence of contact
between the father and his daughter.
173. See, generally, Crawford, Graduate School Support: One Last Dip Into the Proverbial Parental
Pocketbook, 56 IND. L. J. 541 (1981).
174. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-7(c) (1978).
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Although statutes that omit the term "minor" can be liberally construed,
the language in New Mexico's statute seems to compel an end to jurisdiction when the child75 reaches adulthood. New Mexico courts have so
construed the statute.'
The earliest New Mexico case interpreting an earlier version of this
statute' 76 is In re Coe's Estate.1 7 7 The plaintiff in Coe was a former wife

who had been awarded custody of the children. 78 She sought to receive
continuing child support from her deceased former husband's estate.179
Although all of the children were over the age of majority, she maintained
that the only way liability for child support could be terminated was by
a modification of the decree. She argued that the payments were still
accruing (because there had been no modification).' 80 The court rejected
her argument and held that the statute created a jurisdictional limitation
barring recovery of post-minority support:
A proceeding for [support] does not invoke the equity powers of the
court but is controlled by statute. The court is only authorized to
exercise such power as the statute expressly gives, and such as is
necessary to make its orders and decrees effective.''
Because the legislature had not authorized post-minority support, the
court was without power to do so. The decision was then in accord with
the rulings of most jurisdictions.' 2

The issue did not arise again until 1978 when Spingola v. Spingola'8 3

was decided. In the interim, New Mexico had reduced its age of majority
to eighteen. Spingola involved an upward modification of child support
based on the increased needs of the Spingola's three children-ages six,
ten, and thirteen-and the fact that Dr. Spingola's income had substantially increased.' 4 The trial court's denial of an increase was reversed
and the case was remanded with instructions to the trial court to consider
ten criteria in determining the child support obligations of the parents.
On remand, the trial court conducted a new hearing and entered a new
175. See, e.g., Christiansen v. Christiansen, 100 N.M. 102, 666 P.2d 781 (1983); Psomas v.
Psomas, 99 N.M. 606, 661 P.2d 884 (1983); Spingola v. Spingola, 93 N.M. 598, 603 P.2d 708
(1979).
176. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 25-706 (1941). The language of that statute was very similar to the
present version.
177. 56 N.M. 578, 247 P.2d 162 (1952).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 581, 247 P.2d at 164, (citing Marleau v. Marleau, 95 Ohio St. 162, 115 N.E. 1009
(1917)).
182. In re Coe's Estate, 56 N.M. at 580-81, 247 P.2d at 164.
183. 91 N.M. 737, 580 P.2d 958 (1978).
184. Id. at 740, 580 P.2d at 961.
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order which provided for post-minority support for the children's educational expenses. 85 That decision was appealed.' 86 The original decree
incorporated a stipulated settlement which provided that the parties would
share equally the expense of sending their children to college. 87
' The trial
court modified this provision to provide that Dr. Spingola would bear the
entire amount of college expenses. The money was to be put in trust
during the children's minority and disbursed after they reached majority.
Dr. Spingola agreed to the modification. Ironically, it was Mrs. Spingola
who challenged the provision, apparently because it entailed a reduction
in current support in contemplation of the future receipt of a substantial
amount for college education.'
The New Mexico Supreme Court struck down the trial court's decision
to shift the full burden of educational support to Dr. Spingola.' 89 The
effect of the decision voided the initial stipulated agreement that educational support be shared. "9The court acknowledged that other jurisdictions had upheld post-minority support decrees where the supporting
parent has agreed to the provision in a settlement agreement, 9' but decided
that the subject matter jurisdiction of the court cannot be extended by
agreement of the parties.' 92 The court went on to suggest that such an
agreement might be enforceable under a contractual theory not explicitly
related to a child support decree or agreement. ' To date, that possibility
has not been tested in the New Mexico courts.
The trust fund provision in Spingola whereby funds were to be accumulated in a fund to be disbursed to the child for educational expenses
after he reaches majority is called an "accumulative decree."' 94 It is a
mechanism that has been used in other jurisdictions with statutes similar
to that in New Mexico.' 95 Properly used, it could avoid the jurisdictional
barrier presented by the statutory language. The order and the payments
are in effect during the minority of the child. The court's jurisdiction
185. Id.
186. Spingola v. Spingola, 93 N.M. 598, 603 P.2d 708 (1979).
187. Id. at 599, 603 P.2d at 709.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 710.
190. Id.
191. Martin v. Martin, 511 P.2d 1097 (Okla. 1973); Robrock v. Robrock, 167 Ohio St. 479, 150
N.E.2d 421 (1958).
192. Spingola, 93 N.M. at 600, 603 P.2d at 710 (citing Overton v. New Mexico State Tax
Comm'n, 81 N.M. 28, 462 P.2d 613 (1969)).
193. Spingola, 93 N.M. at 600, 603 P.2d at 710.
194. Washburn, supra note 1,at 333.
195. Spingola, 603 P.2d at 710, cited the following cases in which accumulative decrees were
permitted in states with statutes similar to New Mexico's: Stoner v. Weiss, 96 Okla. 285, 222 P.
547 (1924); Underwood v. Underwood, 162 Wash. 204, 298 P. 318 (1931); Maitzen v. Maitzen,
24 il1. App. 2d 32, 163 N.E.2d 840 (1959).
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terminates, as required by statute, with the disbursement of the funds at
the end of the child's minority. The Spingola court cited examples where
such funds had been permitted, then dismissed the possibility as a minority
position without explaining why New Mexico's statute precludes this
option. 19
The rationales offered in jurisdictions which do not permit accumulative
decrees include the fact that courts ought not to accomplish indirectly a
' Also, some courts have reasoned
result which they may not do directly. 97
that it is inappropriate to establish a trust fund if the child is very young
because at an early age the court can determine neither the child's ability
and desire to go to college nor the father's ability to send him. 98
Spingola is an interesting case because it highlights the conflicting
policies courts must resolve in such cases. N.M. STAT. ANN. §40-4-11
provides that: "[T]he court . . . shall make a specific determination and
finding of the amount of support to be paid by a parent to provide properly
for the care, maintenance and education of the minor children, considering
the financial resources of the parent."' [Emphasis added.] Spingola I
describes the state's intent in providing educational support. "One of the
paramount concerns of the courts in child support cases is that a high
level of education and training be afforded children. The finest education
that the parents can reasonably afford should be the criterion."2'° That
goal will not often be achieved when support ends at eighteen.
Three years after Spingola II was decided, Psomas v. Psomas2 ° ' challenged the concept of automatic emancipation. Psomas involved an appeal
on the issue of whether the trial court erred in awarding post-minority
child support for a child who would still be in high school on his eighteenth
birthday.202
Mrs. Psomas argued that the statutory "age of majority," set at age
eighteen, was to operate only as a presumption of emancipation which
could be rebutted by proof of facts to the contrary in particular cases.2 3
She claimed that her son might be forced to drop out of high school and
seek employment to support himself if support payments stopped. Inasmuch as physical or mental disabilities rebut the presumption of emancipation, so too should this situational dependency. The state Supreme
196. Spingola, 93 N.M. at 600, 603 P.2d at 710.
197. See Spence v. Spence, 266 A.2d 29 (D.C. App. 1970); Grapin v. Grapin, 450 So. 2d 853,
854 (Fla. 1984); Allison v. Allison, 188 Kan. 593, 363 P.2d 795 (1961).
198. Johnson v. Johnson, 346 Mich. 418, 78 N.W.2d 216 (1956); see generally Washburn, supra
note 1, at 332-34.
199. N.M. STAT. ANN. §40-4-11(A) (1978).
200. Spingola, 91 N.M. 737, 744, 580 P.2d 958, 965.
201. 99 N.M. 606, 661 P.2d 884 (1983).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 607, 661 P.2d at 885.
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Court in Psomas held that "the need for certainty and uniformity is too
great to allow the type of exception requested here," and reversed the
trial court's award of post-minority support. 2'
It is interesting to note the element of policy that creeps into Psomas.
The court could have decided the case on purely jurisdictional grounds,
as in Spingola H, but it did not. Instead, the court cited the greater
importance of uniformity and certainty.2 '5 The implication from Psomas
is that if a greater value were placed on post-minority education, the
court could create an exception. To date it has not done so.
The most recent New Mexico case dealing with post-minority support
for education is Christiansen v. Christiansen.2' In that case the parties,
while married, entered into a written agreement which purported to divide
their community property.20 7 It provided that each parent would give their
child $5,000 from the sale of their residence, presumably to be used for
college.2 8 The trial court declined to admit the agreement into evidence
because it was not properly acknowledged, but went on to rule that the
parties would be jointly responsible for providing post-minority education
for their child. 2' The appellate court overruled the trial court, citing the
jurisdictional statute"' and the language in Spingola as determinative of
the issue of post-minority support. 2"' There was no discussion of policy
nor the fact that the noncustodial parent had agreed to pay.2t2
Thus, New Mexico has continued to adhere to its earlier decision that
the legislature imposed a jurisdictional limitation upon the power of courts
to award post-minority support. In the process, it has rejected the "accumulative trust," the "rebuttable presumption," and the "stipulated agreements should be enforced" arguments for overcoming the limiting language
of the statute.
V. CONCLUSION
As illustrated by the New Mexico examples, jurisdictional preclusion
is an unsatisfactory resolution of this complex and policy-laden area of
domestic relations law. While some states have enacted statutes which
affirmatively confer jurisdiction on divorce courts over children after they
204. Id. at 608, 661 P.2d at 886.
205. id.
206. 100 N.M. 102, 666 P.2d 781 (1983).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 104, 666 P.2d at 783.
211. "Spingola v. Spingola, (citations omitted) does not give the trial court jurisdiction over postminority education for children." Id. at 104, 666 P.2d at 783.
212. Id.
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reach age eighteen, most have not. Many states rely on statutory interpretation of language that was drafted before the age of majority was
reduced. Deciding how the legislature intended to resolve an issue that
was largely nonexistent when the law was passed is an exercise in futility.
Some courts use the absence of restrictive language to implement the
policies they favor.2"3 Other courts create a jurisdictional bar and avoid
policy issues altogether.2" 4 The result necessarily leads to conflicting decisions, often within the same jurisdiction,2 t5 and unnecessary litigation.
The time has come for legislative action in states that decline to permit
post-minority support because of perceived statutory barriers. Uniform
legislation in the area of domestic relations has proved quite successful.2" 6
The statute which follows is an attempt to incorporate the desirable aspects
217
of existing legislation. It includes the explicit language of Illinois' statute
in the framework of Washington's Dissolution of Marriage Act,2t 8 together
with a codification of factors that have emerged from national case law.
MODEL STATUTE: THE UNIFORM SUPPORT FOR EDUCATION ACT
A. In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, legal separation, declaration of invalidity, maintenance, or child support, the court may award
sums of money out of the property and income of either or both parties
for the education of the child or children, whatever their age, as equity
may require, whether application is made therefor before or after such
child has, or children have, attained majority age. In making such awards,
the court shall consider all relevant factors which shall appear reasonable
and necessary, including but not limited to the following:
1. the financial resources of the parents;
2. the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage
not been dissolved;
3. the financial resources of the child;
4. the commitment to, and aptitude of, the child for the requested
education; and
5. the child's relationship with his parents, including mutual affection
and shared goals as well as responsiveness to parental advice and
guidance.
213. See supra note 17.
214. See supra note 22.
215. See, e.g., New York and Pennsylvania; there is no consistent position within these states in
regard to post-minority support.
216. Unif. Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 9A U.L.A. 647 (1979); Unif. Custody Jurisdiction Act, 9 U.L.A. III (1979).
217. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 40, para. 513 (1977).
218. WASH. REV. CODE §26.09.100 (1976).

